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FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION OF SALT LAKE CITY,

:
:

Cert No.

Respondent,
vs.

Category No. 13

GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC.
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:
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:
* * * * * * * *

STATEMENT OP PACTS
Respondent First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Salt
Lake City (First Federal) disagrees with several statements of fact
set forth by Petitioner Air Terminal Gifts, Inc. (Air Terminal).
References are to the paragraph numbers in Air Terminal's Statement
of Facts.
1 and 4.

Air Terminal asserts that the note and purchase

agreement were an "integrated, package transaction", citing a
conclusion of law by the District Court. The Court of Appeals was
not bound by any conclusion of law by the District Court nor is the
Supreme Court bound.
any integration.

There is no finding of fact that there was

The only incorporation was contained in the

security agreement which, in paragraph 2, stated in reference to
the promissory note that it was "incorporated" within the security
agreement.

The note has no such incorporation.

-1-

8.

Air Terminal states that the written list showing the

purpose of the loan by First Federal was "in part to pay Gump &
Ayers $18,500 and to cover the Morse shortfall" (emphasis added).
The $18,500 was not in addition to the Morse shortfall but was a
part of the Morse shortfall as shown by Exhibit G in Air Terminal's
petition which lists Gump & Ayers' $18,500 under the heading ITEMS
DUE TO MORSE SHORTFALL.
12.

Air Terminal asserts that the Court of Appeals' opinion

concludes that "Gump & Ayers received no 'benefit' from the First
Federal loan"e

That is not a correct interpretation of the Court

of Appeals' opinion which stated:
There is no question that Gump & Ayers, as general
partner of Sunayers, was a fiduciary to Air Terminal and
that proceeds of the loan were used to satisfy debts of
the Sunayers development project for which Air Terminal
had given its note. However, Air Terminal cites no authority for the proposition that these facts alone establish that its note was negotiated "for the benefit" of
Gump & Ayers. Furthermore, the case law interpreting
provisions identical to §70A-3-304(2) require a more
substantial link to the fiduciary's personal interests
than exists here.
ARGUMENT
QUESTION I.

Air Terminal asserts that the terms of the

security agreement are incorporated within the note because of the
provision in the note that
reference is made to the purchase and security
agreement for additional rights of the holder
hereof.
The reference is not an incorporation. The note does not "contain"
the provisions of the security agreement.

Consequently, there is

no additional promise which would destroy negotiability.
-2-

In 5 Anderson Uniform Commercial Code, § 3-105.12 it is
stated:
A contemporaneous agreement is not necessarily read together with an instrument for
purposes of determining its negotiability,
although the agreement and instrument may be
read together for other purposes.
In Section 3-119.3, Anderson states:
The fact that a note is given in connection with a conditional sale does not affect
the negotiability of the note because the condition of the sales contract is not to be
incorporated into the note.
We concede that as between the original parties, the seller
and the purchaser,

the documents could be construed together.

That is not true, however, in determining the negotiability of the
note in the hands of a third party, and in determining whether or
not the third party is a holder in due course. In the latter situation, the note is negotiable despite the reference to the security
agreement and the third party is a holder in due course.
There are various provisions in mortgages and other security
instruments which, although if contained in the note itself would
make the note conditional, do not make the note conditional when
they are contained only in the security agreement.

Examples are

provisions for the protection of security and provisions for payment of taxes, both of which are indefinite in amount (5 Anderson
3-106.15)
A negotiable promissory note and contemporaneously executed
mortgage will not be construed as one instrument where to do so
renders the note non-negotiable. Bradley v. Buffinaton, 500 S.W.2d
-3-

314, (Mo.App. 1973).
General rules of construction respecting contemporaneously
executed instruments are inapplicable where negotiability of an
instrument is involved, i.e., where it is in the hands of a holder
in due course.

McLean v. Paddock. 78 N.M. 234, 430 P.2d 392,

(1967) .
A note's negotiability must be determined by the terms on its
face.

In holding that a non-negotiable note could not be made

negotiable by the terms of a separate document, the New Mexico
Court stated:
The whole purpose of the concept of a
negotiable instrument under Article 3 is to
declare that transferees in the ordinary course
of business are only to be held liable for
information appearing in the instrument itself
and will not be expected to know of any limitations on negotiability or changes in terms,
etc., contained in any separate documents. The
whole idea of the facilitation of easy transfer
of notes and instruments requires that a transferee be able to trust what the instrument
says, and be able to determine the validity of
the note and its negotiability from the language in the note itself. First State Bank at
Gallup v. Clark. 91 N.M. 117, 570 P.2d 1144,
1147 (1977).
Negotiability is determined from the face of the instrument
without reference to extrinsic facts and "the conditional or unconditional character of the promise or order is to be determined by
what is expressed in the instrument itself".

Holsonback v. First

State Bank of Albertville, 30 UCC Rep Serv 222, 224; 394 So2d 381
(Ala App, 1980).

-4-

evidence that Morse has made any claim.

Therefore, there is no

basis for any indemnification.
In the second place, even if there were a right of indemnification, that would not make the note voidable. Here^ the Court of
Appeals' reasoning was that any obligation to indemnify did not
make the note "voidable" and that although there may be a claim by
Air Terminal against Sunayers or Gump & Ayers because of this indemnification provision in the security agreement that is not something that makes the note voidable.

The Court stated:

In support of its holding, the court stated
"[the]...inclusion of the word * voidable' [in
U.C.C. §3-304(1)(b)]1 is meant to restrict the
provision to notice of a defense which will
permit any party to avoid his original obligation on the instrument as distinguished from
a setoff or counterclaim." Id. (referring to
the Official Comments to the Uniform Commercial
Code).
Similarly, The Purchase and Security Agreement gives Air Terminal the right to indemnification from Sunayers for any reduction in
capital of the Sunayers Limited Partnership
resulting from the Morse Shortfall, but it does
not render Air Terminal's obligation on the
note voidable under §70A-3-304 (1) (b) . Instead,
Air Terminal's right to partial indemnification
from Sunayers is independent of its obligation
to pay on the air Terminal note. Air Terminal
may have a separate claim for indemnification
against Sunayers or Gump & Ayers, but it cannot
use this claim as a defense to its obligations
to First Federal on the note.
Air Terminal argues that the Appellate Court's decision is in
conflict with Calfo v. D. C. Stewart Company, et al., 30 Utah Adv.
Rep. 8, 111 P.2d 697 (Utah 1986) concerning what constitutes notice

1

The negotiability of an instrument which contained all the
elements of negotiability specified in the UCC was not affected by
reference in the instrument to the transaction giving rise to the
instrument.

Federal Factors, Inc> v. Wellbanke, 3 UCC Rep Serv

813; 241 Ark 44, 406 SW2d 712 (1966).
The court in Northwestern Bank v. Neal, 25 UCC Rep Serv 487;
248 SE2d 585 (S.C. 1978) quoted and relied upon the official comment to UCC § 3-119(2):
If the instrument itself states that it is
subject to>or governed by, any other agreement,
it is not negotiable under this Article; but
if it merely refers to a separate agreement or
states that it arises out of such an agreement,
it is negotiable.
QUESTION II.

Air Terminal argues that because of an indem-

nification in the security agreement that the note is voidable.
In the first place, there are no facts creating any right of
indemnification.

The indemnification agreement in paragraph 11

excepts any losses "caused by specific acts or omissions of the
purchaser" (Exhibit D to Air Terminal's brief).

The purchaser is

Air Terminal. Air Terminal performed a specific act in executing
the note. It cannot now claim that it is being indemnified against
liability on its own note. The other indemnification is contained
in paragraph 12 of the security agreement which provides that
Sunayers and Gump & Ayers will reimburse Air Terminal "for the
reduction of the purchaser's portion of any distribution

based

upon any claims...by...Morse". There is no evidence that there is
any reduction of any distribution to Air Terminal nor is there any

-5-

of potential infirmity, Calfo was cited for the proposition "when
determining the negotiability, only the instrument in question
should be examined", which is a correct interpretation of Calfo.
This court in Calfo held that the note on its face contained language which made it payable upon final closing "when Buyers exercise their option to purchase".

The court there correctly held

that the note was conditional upon its face and was payable at an
indefinite time and therefore, was not negotiable.

The decision

here is not in conflict with Calfo.
QUESTION III. Air Terminal argues that knowledge that a fiduciary received $18,500 of the Morse shortfall prohibited First
Federal from being a holder in due course because of § 70A-3-3 04
relating to a fiduciary's acting in breach of a fiduciary duty.
Air Terminal eliminates the crucial phrase in quoting that section
of the code which provides:
(2) The purchaser has notice of a claim against the
instrument when he has knowledge that a fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in payment
of or as security for his own debt or in any
transaction for his own benefit or otherwise
in breach of duty. (emphasis added)
Air Terminal omitted the last phrase "or otherwise in breach of
duty". There was no breach of duty by Gump & Ayers in its borrowing for and on behalf of the partnership Sunayers the $100,000
merely because part of the Morse shortfall included money owed by
Morse to Gump & Ayers.
Also, subsection (2) relates to a transaction for the benefit
of the fiduciary.

This transaction was for the benefit of the

-7-

partnership to raise funds that the partnership needed to pay obligations of the partnership incurred on the Sunflower project.
There was therefore no breach of duty such as there would have been
had the proceeds of the loan been intended for the personal use of
the partner Gump & Ayers.
Subsection (2) applies when the taker knows that notes held
by a partnership are negotiated to it for a non-partnership purpose. As stated in 5 Anderson Uniform Commercial Code § 3-304.29:
When the taker knows that notes held by the
partnership are negotiated to it for a nonpartnership purpose, the taker cannot be a
holder in due course.
Here the loan was for a partnership purpose of paying off the debts
of the partnership.
QUESTION IV.

For the first time the argument is asserted by

Air Terminal that, since the assignment was made as security for
Gump & Ayers own $100,000 debt, that caused it to be for the
benefit of Gump & Ayers and made the note was voidable.

This was

neither raised in the lower court nor in the Court of Appeals.
However, the evidence in this case shows that Gump & Ayers, the
fiduciary, was borrowing not for its own benefit but to raise funds
for the partnership Sunayers.

Exhibit G in Air Terminal's brief

is captioned "Monies needed for Sunflower" and showed Gump & Ayers,
the fiduciary, was borrowing to raise funds for Sunflower.

No

logical contention can be made that Gump & Ayers, by putting its
own credit on the line for the partnership, was doing something
that would make the note voidable.

-8-

CONCLUSION
There is no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Furthermore, Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court
in setting forth what considerations govern review of certiorari
sets forth four criteria.

Only the fourth one appears to be

relevant which is "when the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of municipal, state or federal law which has not been
but should be settled by this Court". The Court of Appeals decision applies provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code to the peculiar facts of this case and relies upon the many

decisions con-

struing same. There is no need for settlement by this Court.
The petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted this /d$<-> day of May, 1989.
John W. Lowe
Attorney for Respondent
First Federal Savings & Loan
Association of Salt Lake City

Isl John W. Lo^e
John W. Lowe
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